# Global spreading of Omicron variant of COVID-19 

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#### Abstract

Although two years have passed since the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak, various variants are still rampant across the globe. The Omicron variant, in particular, is rapidly gained dominance through its ability to spread. In this study, we elucidated the spatial distribution pattern of Omicron from a global perspective. We used the cumulative number of notified COVID-19 cases per country spanning four weeks up to February 10, 2022, and the proportion of the Omicron variant genomic sequences from the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID). The global spatial distribution of Omicron was investigated by analyzing Global \& Local Moran's $I$ and GetisOrd General G. The spatial weight matrix was defined by combining K-Nearest neighbour and flight connectivity between countries. The results showed that the epidemic is relatively severe in Europe, countries with a high number of Omicron cases and incidence tended to be clustered spatially. In contrast, there are relatively fewer Omicron cases in Asia and Africa, with few hotspots identified. Furthermore, some noted spatial outliers, such as a lowvalue area surrounded by high-value areas, deserve special attention. This study has improved our awareness of the global distri-


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bution of Omicron. The findings can provide helpful information for deploying targeted epidemic preparedness for the subsequent COVID-19 variant and future epidemics.

## Introduction

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a new infectious disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a RNA viruses, which enters through the respiratory system with fever and cough as the main clinical manifestations. However, extrapulmonary manifestations are common in vulnerable patients (Wang et al., 2020). It is the most severe public health crisis since the Spanish flu a hundred years ago. As of July 2, 2022, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), over 545 million confirmed cases and over 6.3 million deaths had been reported globally. Moreover, as with all RNA viruses, COVID-19 is also undergoing constant changes, producing many mutant strains (Kannan et al., 2022). The hazards of these variants greatly enhance and manifest a rise in transmissibility, virulence, change in clinical presentation and commonly diagnostic failure resulting in a significant decline in the effectiveness of the healthcare and social measures (Alkhatib et al., 2021). The SARS-CoV-2 variants include B.1.1.7 (Alpha), B.1.351 (Beta), P.1 (Gamma), B.1.617.2 (Delta), and, the most recently detected, B.1.1.529 (Omicron), which has been the least studied.

The Omicron variant was first reported on November 24, 2021 in South Africa (Callaway et al., 2021). According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Omicron variant has at least 50 mutations, including more than 30 amino acid substitutions in the receptor-binding spike protein - the main vaccine target. As a result, Omicron's immune escape ability is very different from that of its predecessors (CDC, 2021; Zhang et al., 2022). Specifically, three mutations, N440K, T478K, and N501Y, increase Omicron's rate of infection (Chen et al., 2022). Omicron's transmission speed is alarming; it quickly replaced Delta as the previous dominant variant.

To our knowledge, using geo-spatial analysis to investigate the spatial pattern of COVID-19 incidence can indicate the magnitude and impact of the pandemic, help model and predict disease evolution and provide decision-making support for governments (Islam et al., 2021). A review summarized the research on geographical and geo-spatial analysis in understanding locations and the spatial patterns of COVID-19, revealing the evolution of the COVID-19 phenomenon (Franch-Pardo et al., 2020) and a study has tracked changes in the spatial patterns of confirmed COVID19 cases in Sichuan, China over the epidemic course of the infec-
tion (Jia et al., 2022). Another study predicted the spatiotemporal spread of COVID-19 based on geolocated Twitter data as indicator of human movement (Bisanzio et al., 2020). A similar study examined spatial cluster patterns of COVID-19 in China (Li et al., 2020). To date, studies evaluating the spatial spread of the Omicron variant in the whole world remain limited. In this study, we examined spatial clustering patterns of the Omicron variant of COVID-19 at the country level to better understand the outbreak patterns and thus guide local health authorities with regard to deploying epidemic preparedness.

## Materials and methods

## Study site

This study was performed with 192 countries covering all continents. Data of country-based Omicron cases were estimated using the number of new confirmed cases worldwide from the Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center, USA (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html) and the proportion of genes sequenced for the Omicron variant provided by the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) (2022). It should be noted that the data spans four weeks up to February 10, 2022, and the data provided by GISAID contains only 146 countries. For 46 countries where GISAID did not provide a proportion of genetic sequencing, we considered the average proportion of each country in relation to the continent it belongs to (North America 98.3\%, Africa 97.4\%, Oceania 95.4\%, South America
$93.2 \%$, Europe $91.2 \%$, and Asia $86.4 \%$ ). We did so as the Omicron epidemic proportion in each country has been shown to be a strong indicator of new cases in that country (Tiecco et al., 2022). Additionally, global airline flights data we recollected from tripnoter.cn (https://www.tripnoter.cn/). This dataset, including the countries of origin and destination determines the potential, crossborder transmission points of the Omicron variant. Figure 1 shows the top five routes with the highest number of flights per country.

## Statistics

This study, using the number of Omicron cases and incidence, analyzed the extent of Omicron variant development and spatial distribution of Omicron variant in countries around the world. Spatial clustering analysis with Omicron cases and incidence was conducted at the country level. Global Moran's I (Moran, 1950) and Getis-Ord General G (Getis and Ord, 2010) were applied to describe the general spatial distribution pattern. Global Moran's $I$ indicates spatial autocorrelation, which informs whether or not the spatial distribution is random. A positive value of Global Moran's $I$ at $\mathrm{P}<0.05$, indicates the presence of clustering and negative value dispersed pattern. Getis-Ord General G can further identify whether the cluster pattern consists of high values or low values.

Local spatial statistics, including Anselin Local Moran's $I$ and Getis-Ord Gi*, were employed to capture spatial patterns of Omicron variant and the location of clusters. Local Moran's $I$ can identify the clusters and outliers and categorize them into four types: The High-Low (HL) outcome describes a high value surrounded by low values and the Low-High (LH) pattern a low value surrounded by high values (Anselin, 2010). High-High (HH) and Low-Low (LL) represent clusters with high or low-values, respec-


Figure 1. The top-5 routes with respect to the number of flights per country.
tively, while HL and LH are termed outliers. Getis-ord Gi* is also a local cluster commonly called hotspots analysis. It can identify hotspots (high-value clusters) and coldspots (low-value clusters) with different levels of confidence (Getis and Ord, 2010).

As a critical component of spatial clusters analysis, the spatial weight matrix in this study was defined by combining a non-parametric supervised learning method, the k-Nearest Neighbors (Fix and Hodges, 1951) with the flight connectivity between countries. Population mobility is a critical factor concerning infectious diseases transmission (Gushulak and Macpherson, 2000). The number of airlines was used to describe the population movements between countries since air travel was considered a major mean of infection spread (Findlater and Bogoch, 2018). We assigned the weights according to the normalized value of global airlines as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
W_{A i j}=n_{i j} / \sum_{m=1}^{M} n_{i m} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $W_{A i j}$ is the weight; $n_{i j}$ the number of flight routes between country $i$ and $j ; m$ the number of countries where country $i$ has direct route access.

To avoid subjective arbitrariness in setting the spatial weight matrix and to emphasize the robustness of the estimation results with different spatial weight selections, we used a nested spatial weight matrix according to Case et al. (1993) containing both the k -Nearest Neighbours method and flight connectivity as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
W_{i j}=\varphi * W_{A i j}+(1-\varphi) * W_{k i j} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $W_{i j}$ is the final weight between country $i$ and $j ; W_{K i j}$ the weight of the k-Nearest Neighbor; and $j$ the coefficient that takes values between 0 and 1 . The closer $j$ is to 0 , the more the spatial weight is related to geographical adjacency, the closer to 1 , the more the spatial weight is related to flight connectivity. The value of K (the number of the nearest neighbours) and $j$ were determined by maximizing Moran's $I$ (Kooijman, 1976; Ping et al., 2004). In this study, K was finalized as 8 and $j$ is finalized as 0.2 .

The production of spatial weight matrix was coded in the Python programming language, vesion 3.8 ; spatial clustering analysis and visualization were conducted in ArcGIS, version 10.2 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA).

## Results

## Overview data

Europe and the Americas were heavily affected by the Omicron variant in the past four weeks. The highest numbers of Omicron cases (Figure 2) were seen in USA $(13,007,600)$, France $(7,877,336)$, India $(5,954,008)$, and Brazil $(4,313,373)$, while


Figure 2. Total numbers of Omicron cases by country, presented as quintiles.

Denmark (19,360/100,000), Israel (17,487/100,000), Slovenia $(13,455 / 100,000)$, Palau $(12,277 / 100,000)$ and Netherlands $(11,585 / 100,000)$ had the high-test incidence (Figure 3). In general, the case numbers and incidence in Africa were lower compared to all other continents, with Europe and Oceania showing much higher infection rates. Some countries had different ranks based on cases and incidence. For example, countries in North and South Africa, Russia, and India had the top $20 \%$ of the cases numbers but only the top $60 \%$ of incidence. Only three countries were without Omicron cases: Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Vanuatu.

## Global spatial correlation analysis

Compared to Getis-Ord General G, Global Moran's $I$ (Table 1) demonstrated a slight spatial autocorrelation of the Omicron variant worldwide among countries ( $\mathrm{P}<0.05$ ). A country's number of Omicron cases and incidence tended to be clustered together with that of its neighbours. The result of Getis-Ord General G (Table 1) further confirmed that high-value aggregations were more likely to appear $(\mathrm{P}<0.01)$.

## Local spatial statistics

Overall, Getis-Ord Gi* identified 15 Omicron hotspots at three confidence levels (Table 2). Those with $99 \%$ confidence were observed in four continents: Asia (India), Europe (Germany,

France, the United Kingdom and Italy), North America (USA), and South America (Brazil) (Figure 4). Minor (compared to the number of Europe hotspots) but still at significant confidence levels were seen in the Americas. No coldspot was recognized, and the remaining 177 countries were diagnosed as statistically non-significant.

Table 3 shows the 29 hotspots found at three confidence levels (identified by Getis-Ord $\mathrm{Gi}^{*}$ ). There were 17 hotspots at the $99 \%$ confidence level, all of which in Europe and Israel, so only the European part of the map is shown here (Figure 5). Oceania saw hotspots at more minor levels compared to Europe but still with statistical significance. No coldspot was recognized and the situation in the remaining 163 countries were statistically non-significant. Seven European countries were found both significantly hotspots in terms of cases and incidence, but significant level

Table 1. Global spatial clustering of Omicron case numbers and incidence.

| Variable | Moran's $I$ <br> (Z score) | Getis-Ord General G <br> (Z score) |
| :--- | ---: | :---: |
| Number of cases | $0.065(2.769)$ | $0.012(4.597)$ |
| Incidence | $0.426(14.504)$ | $0.011(12.740)$ |
| $*$ Sisen |  |  |



Figure 3. Omicron incidence (per 100,000 population) by country, presented as quintiles.
changed. Only Germany and France were both $99 \%$ significant hotspots for cases and incidence. The significance level of cases was higher than the incidence for Italy and Spain, while lower for Netherland, Belgium and Portugal.

From the perspective of Omicron cases, Local Moran's $I$ iden-
tified 43 countries as significantly autocorrelated. The HH class included eight European countries and two North American ones (Figure 6), where Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Netherlands, and Portugal were classified as HH clusters and hotspots. The LL clusters were all African countries and they

Table 2. Spatial distribution of Omicron cases and hotspots.

| Country | Case number | Z score | P-value | Confidence level |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Argentina | $1,907,318$ | 1.657 | 0.097 | $90 \%$ |
| Belgium | $1,058,675$ | 1.648 | 0.099 | $90 \%$ |
| Brazil | $4,313,373$ | 3.067 | 0.002 | $99 \%$ |
| Canada | 490,916 | 1.692 | 0.091 | $90 \%$ |
| France | $7,877,336$ | 5.822 | 0 | $99 \%$ |
| Germany | $4,201,627$ | 3.197 | 0.001 | $99 \%$ |
| India | $5,954,008$ | 3.778 | 0 | $99 \%$ |
| Italy | $3,767,986$ | 2.611 | 0.009 | $95 \%$ |
| Mexico | 934,232 | 2.191 | 0.028 | $95 \%$ |
| Portugal | $1,250,944$ | 0.077 | $90 \%$ |  |
| Spain | $2,624,668$ | 2.494 | 0.013 | $95 \%$ |
| The Netherlands | $2,057,891$ | 2.567 | 0.010 | $99 \%$ |
| United Kingdom | $3,194,382$ | 2.997 | 0.003 | $99 \%$ |
| USA | $13,007,600$ | 9.107 | 0 | $99 \%$ |
| Turkey | $2,382,036$ | 1.692 | 0.091 | $90 \%$ |



Figure 4. Spatial hotspots of Omicron cases.


Figure 5. Spatial hotspots of Omicron incidence in Europe.


Figure 6. Spatial clustering patterns of Omicron cases.

almost covered the continent geographically. Only LH outliers were recognized and they were seen in 11 countries (Table 4). With exception of Paraguay, these countries were islands, close to the sea or a continental border.

From the perspective of Omicron incidence, Local Moran's $I$ identified 98 countries as significantly autocorrelated. The HH class covered most of Europe, with Turkey the only HH country outside (Figure 7). The LL clusters ( 57 countries) were mainly identified in Asia, Africa and Pacific, with only four HL outliers dispersedly distributed in inland Asia, southeast Asia, eastern Africa and western Pacific (Table 5). The six LH outliers were identified in Europe, Middle East and north Africa.

Based on incidence, the pattern of spatial autocorrelation seems to be more informative. More HH and LL clusters were identified using incidence than based on the number of cases. Mexico and Canada, categorized as HH class of cases, and Comoros and Somalia categorized as LL, were not significantly recognized as clusters nor spatial outliers of incidence. Morocco was the only country classified as LH outlier from both incidence and cases number perspectives.

## Discussion

With slightly positive spatial autocorrelation of global Omicron cases and incidence, we applied Global Moran's $I$ and Getis-Ord General G to test the type of spatial autocorrelation, and the result claimed the existence of significant high-value clusters. Local Moran's $I$ and Getis-Ord Gi* were calculated to locate the clusters and explore spatial outliers. Hotspots with significant confidence were identified in four (Asia, Europe, South America and North America) out of seven continents, which is of concern as many of these hotspots are connected and there is a high probability that they will eventually cause the dispersion of the Omicron variant worldwide.

Identifying spatial outliers may be more crucial than cluster detection for infectious diseases control. For example, Andorra, Ireland and Luxembourg have so far fewer Omicron variant cases, but they were surrounded by HH clusters at the time of our study, requiring extra protection strategies to avoid worse pandemic situations. Likewise, Belarus, Morocco and Syria were in a similar sit-

Table 3. Spatial distribution of Omicron incidence and hotspots.

| Country | Incidence (per 100,000) | Z score | P-value | Confidence level |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Andorra | 19,360.00 | 6.176 | 0 | 99\% |
| Austria | 7,761.57 | 2.208 | 0.027 | 95\% |
| Belgium | 17,487.10 | 4.258 | 0 | 99\% |
| Czech Republic | 5,442.05 | 1.998 | 0.046 | 95\% |
| Denmark | 12,277.40 | 2.196 | 0.028 | 95\% |
| Estonia | 11,584.90 | 4.295 | 0 | 99\% |
| France | 11,305.50 | 3.162 | 0.002 | 99\% |
| Georgia | 6,482.69 | 1.839 | 0.066 | 90\% |
| Germany | 6,740.96 | 3.189 | 0.001 | 99\% |
| Iceland | 11,014.50 | 3.823 | 0 | 99\% |
| Ireland | 4,621.73 | 2.487 | 0.012 | 95\% |
| Israel | 10,735.80 | 3.780 | 0 | 99\% |
| Italy | 6,208.11 | 1.732 | 0.083 | 90\% |
| Latvia | 5,791.22 | 1.899 | 0.058 | 90\% |
| Liechtenstein | 10,269.50 | 2.176 | 0.030 | 95\% |
| Lithuania | 4,531.30 | 2.431 | 0.015 | 95\% |
| Luxembourg | 9,844.85 | 3.508 | 0 | 99\% |
| Monaco | 9,781.56 | 3.627 | 0 | 99\% |
| Netherlands | 9,592.73 | 2.662 | 0.008 | 99\% |
| Norway | 9,461.32 | 3.476 | 0 | 99\% |
| Palau | 5,743.77 | 2.194 | 0.028 | 95\% |
| Portugal | 8,988.20 | 3.727 | 0 | 99\% |
| San Marino | 8,558.58 | 3.647 | 0 | 99\% |
| Slovakia | 3,123.68 | 1.729 | 0.084 | 90\% |
| Slovenia | 8,280.99 | 3.796 | 0 | 99\% |
| Spain | 4,624.56 | 1.841 | 0.066 | 90\% |
| Sweden | 8,111.71 | 3.092 | 0.002 | 99\% |
| Switzerland | 13,455.20 | 3.843 | 0 | 99\% |
| United Kingdom | 6,545.22 | 3.342 | 0 | 99\% |

uation identified from the point of view of having a low incidence, while the countries closest to them had high values. The reason might be due to various reasons, such as not having numerous airline connections or not sharing borders with many countries; for islands none at all. The threat might thus be less than being sur-
rounded by hotspots; however, they still need to be alerted to prevent further spread of the highly infectious variants, such as the Omicron.

This study used a combined spatial weight matrix to include air travel connectivity in the spatial relationships among countries.

Table 4. Omicron cases by country and their spatial clustering patterns.

| Country | Cases no. | Local Moran's I | P-value | Clustering type |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Andorra | 8,175 | -0.379 | 0.006 | LH |
| Bahamas | 2,963 | -0.378 | 0.02 | LH |
| Belgium | 1,058,675 | 0.571 | 0.006 | HH |
| Belize | 15,083 | -0.298 | 0.028 | LH |
| Botswana | 21,977 | 0.095 | 0.042 | LL |
| Burundi | 1,701 | 0.100 | 0.022 | LL |
| Canada | 490,916 | 0.060 | 0.002 | HH |
| Comoros | 274 | 0.105 | 0.004 | LL |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2,545 | 0.106 | 0.002 | LL |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 4,024 | 0.105 | 0.002 | LL |
| Denmark | 1,140,167 | 0.375 | 0.044 | HH |
| France | 7,877,336 | 2.789 | 0.046 | HH |
| Iceland | 40,174 | -0.512 | 0.002 | LH |
| Ireland | 175,072 | -0.299 | 0.008 | LH |
| Jamacia | 18,548 | -0.202 | 0.048 | LH |
| Lesotho | 768 | 0.099 | 0.036 | LL |
| Liberia | 237 | 0.100 | 0.026 | LL |
| Luxembourg | 51,265 | -0.393 | 0.004 | LH |
| Malawi | 3,046 | 0.104 | 0.002 | LL |
| Mexico | 934,232 | 0.708 | 0.01 | HH |
| Morocco | 126,516 | -0.265 | 0.012 | LH |
| Mozambique | 8,000 | 0.097 | 0.016 | LL |
| Netherlands | 2,057,891 | 1.756 | 0.008 | HH |
| Niger | 397 | 0.102 | 0.008 | LL |
| Paraguay | 133,366 | -0.140 | 0.048 | LH |
| Portugal | 1,250,944 | 0.744 | 0.014 | HH |
| Republic of Congo | 1,442 | 0.106 | 0.004 | LL |
| Samoa | 30 | -0.299 | 0.018 | LH |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 512 | 0.106 | 0.002 | LL |
| Senegal | 3,942 | 0.106 | 0.002 | LL |
| Sierra Leone | 148 | 0.100 | 0.018 | LL |
| Somalia | 1,942 | 0.104 | 0.002 | LL |
| South Sudan | 473 | 0.105 | 0.004 | LL |
| Spain | 2,624,668 | 1.558 | 0.014 | HH |
| Sudan | 9,539 | 0.096 | 0.008 | LL |
| Swaziland | 1,051 | 0.102 | 0.018 | LL |
| Switzerland | 881,248 | 0.436 | 0.004 | HH |
| Togo | 1,195 | 0.106 | 0.002 | LL |
| Tonga | 65 | -0.249 | 0.044 | LH |
| United Kingdom | 3,194,382 | 2.168 | 0.008 | HH |
| Zambia | 16,974 | 0.099 | 0.006 | LL |
| Zimbabwe | 5,956 | 0.099 | 0.008 | LL |

[^0]Studies have verified air travel networks' vital role in building spatial relationships while studying disease transmission (Bogoch et al., 2015; Zaki et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2021). Restrictions on international air travel have been found to cut transmission at the regional level, especially at the early stage, which can be essential for controlling pandemics (Kraemer et al., 2020). The challenge is how to develop an adaptive spatial weight matrix framework to respond to changing international travel bans. Changing a country's decision to close borders or lockdown can drastically affect neighbouring countries (Krisztin et al., 2020). Meanwhile, further investigation on the transmission path is needed as the Omicron variant spreads faster and easier than the previous SARS-CoV-2 variants (He et al., 2021). This character may require multi-source traffic information to build spatial weight matrix, such as crossborder logistics routes.

There are some limitations in this study concerning the data used. The first is the uncertainties regarding the number of Omicron cases. The values used in this study were calculated by multiplying the genomic rate and the number of new confirmed COVID-19 cases submitted by each country. The observed frequency varies among countries. Meanwhile, many middle- and low-income countries do not have strong health systems and under-reporting of the number of cases is inevitable. The second limitation is the unequal time lag between sample collection and submission. Due to the inevitable differences between counties, it is difficult to require all the countries to reach the same standard in
terms of time lag. The differences in the time for delivering samples to laboratories, analyzing, and uploading sequence to GISAID can result in biased submission data (Kalia et al., 2021). Though the GISAID website claims the data summarized do not represent exact prevalence, it remains of great value as the largest openaccess portal for collecting SARS-CoV-2 strains data from gaining access worldwide. In addition, due to the limitation of data, we cannot precisely discern whether we referred to a connecting flight or a direct flight. Some countries, e.g., Qatar and Dubai, are airline hubs and many passengers change flights in these countries. How to deal with the population connectivity in these countries still needs further study.

A global tracking system is needed to keep countries updated on the spatial spread of the Omicron variant so that the governments can adjust their national and international pandemic prevention policies. The total cases of the Omicron variant and its spatial pattern reveal the current stage of challenge the world needs to meet. The increasing speed and the transmission rate of the Omicron variant also require attention to prepare for future problems. It is an important but challenging goal for all countries to report newly increased cases timely and accurately. The coordination of global health organizations, such as the WHO, may need to offer aid to those countries lacking sufficient medical resources. Hopefully, every country can learn from the experience with COVID-19 and work together to end the pandemic soon.


Figure 7. Spatial clustering patterns of Omicron incidence.


Table 5. Omicron incidence by country and their spatial clustering patterns.

| Country Inc | ncidence per 100,000 | Local Moran's I | P-value | Type |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Afghanistan | 30.85 | 0.337 | 0.028 | LL |
| Andorra | 6,545.00 | 1.945 | 0.002 | HH |
| Austria | 5,442.05 | 1.050 | 0.002 | HH |
| Bangladesh | 163.82 | 0.368 | 0.002 | LL |
| Belarus | 934.60 | -0.245 | 0.04 | LH |
| Belgium | 8,988.20 | 3.719 | 0.002 | HH |
| Benin | 3.46 | 0.409 | 0.002 | LL |
| Bhutan | 397.21 | 0.342 | 0.01 | LL |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1,526.08 | -0.151 | 0.046 | LH |
| Botswana | 915.34 | 0.266 | 0.004 | LL |
| Brunei | 714.67 | 0.226 | 0.044 | LL |
| Burkina Faso | 3.09 | 0.383 | 0.002 | LL |
| Burundi | 14.58 | 0.415 | 0.004 | LL |
| Cambodia | 7.85 | 0.331 | 0.022 | LL |
| Cameroon | 27.64 | 0.350 | 0.008 | LL |
| Central African Republic | 26.34 | 0.395 | 0.004 | LL |
| Chad | 3.86 | 0.321 | 0.038 | LL |
| China | 0.13 | 0.294 | 0.034 | LL |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 9.35 | 0.450 | 0.002 | LL |
| Croatia | 3,691.25 | 0.431 | 0.004 | HH |
| Czech Republic | 6,482.69 | 0.852 | 0.022 | HH |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 3 O 3.43 | 0.447 | 0.002 | LL |
| Denmark | 19,360.00 | 7.368 | 0.002 | HH |
| Djibouti | 73.58 | 0.337 | 0.014 | LL |
| Eritrea | 21.03 | 0.407 | 0.006 | LL |
| Estonia | 9,592.73 | 1.434 | 0.024 | HH |
| Ethiopia | 13.15 | 0.389 | 0.002 | LL |
| Finland | 3,249.11 | 0.265 | 0.006 | HH |
| France | 11,014.50 | 3.647 | 0.002 | HH |
| Gabon | 83.56 | 0.358 | 0.008 | LL |
| Gambia | 32.04 | 0.308 | 0.042 | LL |
| Germany | 4,531.30 | 1.180 | 0.002 | HH |
| Ghana | 14.88 | 0.348 | 0.008 | LL |
| Guinea | 8.77 | 0.377 | 0.012 | LL |
| Hungary | 3,909.71 | 0.394 | 0.008 | HH |
| Iceland | 10,735.80 | 3.643 | 0.002 | HH |
| India | 332.42 | 0.314 | 0.004 | LL |
| Ireland | 3,123.68 | 0.353 | 0.002 | HH |
| Italy | 5,743.77 | 1.257 | 0.002 | HH |
| Kazakhstan | 1,260.45 | 0.141 | 0.024 | LL |
| Kenya | 11.78 | 0.393 | 0.004 | LL |
| Kyrgyzstan | 186.72 | 0.324 | 0.016 | LL |
| Laos | 179.62 | 0.319 | 0.034 | LL |
| Latvia | 7,761.57 | 1.142 | 0.024 | HH |
| Lesotho | 39.97 | 0.413 | 0.01 | LL |
| Liberia | 5.14 | 0.436 | 0.002 | LL |
| Liechtenstein | 8,280.99 | 2.767 | 0.002 | HH |
| Lithuania | 6,208.11 | 0.761 | 0.02 | HH |
| Luxembourg | 8,558.58 | 3.559 | 0.002 | HH |
| Malawi | 16.07 | 0.441 | 0.002 | LL |

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Table 5. Continued from previous page.

| Country | Incidence per 100,000 | Local Moran's I | P-value | Custering type |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Luxembourg | 8,558.58 | 3.559 | 0.002 | HH |
| Malawi | 16.07 | 0.441 | 0.002 | LL |
| Malaysia | 464.18 | 0.250 | 0.044 | LL |
| Mali | 10.87 | 0.401 | 0.004 | LL |
| Mauritania | 125.95 | 0.346 | 0.012 | LL |
| Monaco | 6,740.96 | 1.855 | 0.004 | HH |
| Mongolia | 4,080.20 | -0.260 | 0.04 | HL |
| Morocco | 345.85 | -0.419 | 0.03 | LH |
| Mozambique | 25.92 | 0.393 | 0.01 | LL |
| Myanmar | 16.41 | 0.404 | 0.006 | LL |
| Namibia | 117.98 | 0.381 | 0.01 | LL |
| Nepal | 318.98 | 0.352 | 0.002 | LL |
| Netherlands | 11,584.90 | 4.785 | 0.002 | HH |
| Niger | 1.61 | 0.424 | 0.006 | LL |
| Nigeria | 1.74 | 0.362 | 0.002 | LL |
| Norway | 9,461.32 | 3.205 | 0.002 | HH |
| Pakistan | 69.99 | 0.359 | 0.002 | LL |
| Palau | 12,277.40 | -1.610 | 0.002 | HL |
| Poland | 2,401.03 | 0.018 | 0.002 | HH |
| Portugal | 11,305.50 | 1.839 | 0.034 | HH |
| Republic of Congo | 34.76 | 0.435 | 0.002 | LL |
| Rwanda | 38.43 | 0.438 | 0.002 | LL |
| San Marino | 9,781.56 | 2.637 | 0.004 | HH |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 253.25 | 0.399 | 0.002 | LL |
| Senegal | 16.92 | 0.431 | 0.006 | LL |
| Seychelles | 7,480.22 | -0.830 | 0.006 | HL |
| Sierra Leone | 2.13 | 0.437 | 0.002 | LL |
| Singapore | 3,229.38 | -0.140 | 0.008 | HL |
| Slovakia | 5,791.22 | 0.990 | 0.012 | HH |
| Slovenia | 13,455.20 | 2.476 | 0.012 | HH |
| South Africa | 144.13 | 0.353 | 0.004 | LL |
| South Sudan | 2.75 | 0.445 | 0.002 | LL |
| Spain | 4,624.56 | 0.818 | 0.002 | HH |
| Sudan | 21.76 | 0.422 | 0.002 | LL |
| Swaziland | 93.22 | 0.403 | 0.004 | LL |
| Sweden | 8,111.71 | 2.567 | 0.002 | HH |
| Switzerland | 9,844.85 | 3.195 | 0.002 | HH |
| Syria | 5.80 | -0.447 | 0.04 | LH |
| Tajikistan | 2.45 | 0.349 | 0.022 | LL |
| Tanzania | 4.97 | 0.405 | 0.002 | LL |
| Thailand | 291.39 | 0.275 | 0.042 | LL |
| Togo | 13.33 | 0.443 | 0.002 | LL |
| Tunisia | 1,644.82 | -0.120 | 0.042 | LH |
| Turkey | 2,803.91 | 0.101 | 0.014 | HH |
| Uganda | 13.52 | 0.435 | 0.002 | LL |
| United Kingdom | 4,621.73 | 1.255 | 0.002 | HH |
| Vatican City | 51.11 | -0.848 | 0.002 | LH |
| Vietnam | 250.67 | 0.289 | 0.032 | LL |
| Zambia | 88.45 | 0.413 | 0.002 | LL |
| Zimbabwe | 40.39 | 0.414 | 0.004 | LL |

HH, High-High cluster; HL, High-Low cluster; LH, Low-High; LL, Low-Low cluster.

## Conclusions

The Omicron variant poses a severe threat to the health of all global citizens. A complete picture of the spatial distribution of Omicron cases can help set strategies with neighbour countries to fight the virus together. This study applied spatial statistics methods at the country level identifying general pattern of high-value clusters in four continents. Different but vital controlling approaches are needed to stop further spread of the Omicron variant, in particular outliers next to countries with many hotspots in Europe. It is a strong need to alert and guard against possible new virus invasions.

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[^0]:    HH, High-High cluster; LH, Low-High cluster; LL, Low-Low cluster.

